Using data on 25 ethnolinguistic groups in the Austronesian language family, this study asks: does cooperation in games vary with socio-ecological differences across cultural groups? The authors suggest that cultural groups that cooperate in subsistence, tend to have intergroup conflict and less intragroup conflict, and are less socially stratified are more likely to play cooperative games compared to other groups. While the results support the first three hypotheses, there is insufficient data to support the fourth. The authors conclude that games serve as training ground for group norms and values.

Using data on 25 ethnolinguistic groups in the Austronesian language family, this study asks: does cooperation in games vary with socio-ecological differences across cultural groups? The authors suggest that cultural groups that cooperate in subsistence, tend to have intergroup conflict and less intragroup conflict, and are less socially stratified are more likely to play cooperative games compared to other groups. While the results support the first three hypotheses, there is insufficient data to support the fourth. The authors conclude that games serve as training ground for group norms and values.

Using data on 25 ethnolinguistic groups in the Austronesian language family, this study asks: does cooperation in games vary with socio-ecological differences across cultural groups? The authors suggest that cultural groups that cooperate in subsistence, tend to have intergroup conflict and less intragroup conflict, and are less socially stratified are more likely to play cooperative games compared to other groups. While the results support the first three hypotheses, there is insufficient data to support the fourth. The authors conclude that games serve as training ground for group norms and values.

In an attempt to explain communal conflict, this study investigated how customary institutions (i.e. legislatures, courts, and chiefs) may impact the communal conflict activity of groups in Africa. The authors suggest that customary authorities act as local enforcements to mitigate within-group conflict, therefore a higher number of customary institutions should decrease communal conflict. Using data from 143 politically relevant ethnic groups, the authors showed support for their hypothesis and demonstrated marginal support that more inclusive customary institutions would be associated with less communal conflict.

In an attempt to explain communal conflict, this study investigated how customary institutions (i.e. legislatures, courts, and chiefs) may impact the communal conflict activity of groups in Africa. The authors suggest that customary authorities act as local enforcements to mitigate within-group conflict, therefore a higher number of customary institutions should decrease communal conflict. Using data from 143 politically relevant ethnic groups, the authors showed support for their hypothesis and demonstrated marginal support that more inclusive customary institutions would be associated with less communal conflict.

The social control hypothesis suggests that ritual human sacrifice may have played an important role in the evolution of social stratification, functioning to legitimize class-based power distinctions by pairing displays of ultimate authority with supernatural justifications. Authors test this hypothesis about human sacrifice with a phylogenetic analysis of 93 Austronesian cultures.

The social control hypothesis suggests that ritual human sacrifice may have played an important role in the evolution of social stratification, functioning to legitimize class-based power distinctions by pairing displays of ultimate authority with supernatural justifications. Authors test this hypothesis about human sacrifice with a phylogenetic analysis of 93 Austronesian cultures.

This book investigates the evolution of military organizations and their activities. Hypotheses frequently relate military organizations to political variables. Data suggested that more politically centralized societies have more sophisticated military organizations which are more likely to be successful in conflict (though military sophistication does not appear to deter attack).

In this study, the authors inspect the relationship between religion, morality, and cooperation by examining the extent to which people associate their deities with moral concern. Using data from 2,228 individuals in 15 different field sites, they find that on average, people tend to ascribe at least some moral concern to their deities, and this effect is stable even after controlling for the influence of explicitly moralistic deities that these societies also worship. The authors also find that ratings of moral concern are not necessarily very high, even for deities that are typically considered to be moralistic, and that there is individual-level variation in the degree of moral concern attributed to deities. In addition, there is an individual-level correlation between how morally interested two selected deities are conceived to be and that being male or more educated decreases the likelihood of associating deities with moral concern. These findings challenge the longstanding belief that belief in moralistic deities is unique to certain societies or religions and instead suggest that the association between deities and moral concern is more widespread and variable, and suggest that the moral character of gods may be tied to cooperation within societies.

This study replicates the study of games conducted by Roberts, Arth and Bush (1959) using new data. Findings support the results of the original study, suggesting that games of strategy are related to social complexity and games of chance are related to games of physical skill.